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Political Parties
Riccardo Pelizzo
Introduction
According to a recent conference report, corruption “exists and has always existed,”
“it is pervasive, and it has far reaching consequences,” it “represents one of the
most significant obstacles to development,” and “it also distorts the proper func-
tioning of democratic institutions.” Yet because corruption “is a symptom of deeper
institutional weakness,” the report also insisted on the importance of strengthening
the key democratic bodies fighting corruption (“Report on Wilton Park Conference
748” in 2004, presented in appendix 2 of this book). Political parties are part of this
set of institutions, aggregating diverse sets of interests, providing the structure for
political participation and representation, and formulating policy options on a
national level (Africa Political Party Finance Initiative 2004). However, political par-
ties are also globally perceived to be the most corrupt institutions (Wolkers 2005).
Therefore, Members of Parliament, in most cases also members of political parties,
have a responsibility to ensure that their parties promote an anti-corruption agenda
in their platform and that internally the party abstains from corrupt practices.
This chapter will outline how strengthening and institutionalizing political par-
ties is therefore important in the fight against corruption. The first section provides
a fairly detailed discussion of the notion of institutionalization. Particular attention
is paid to the fact that the institutionalization of organizations depends on a combi-
nation of factors such as the organization’s age, generational age, adaptability, com-
plexity, autonomy, and coherence. The second section shows how the notion of
institutionalization can be applied to parties and what it means for political parties
to become institutionalized. The third section argues that the potential for corrup-
tion is inversely related to parties’ levels of institutionalization—so that the more a
party is institutionalized, the less likely it is to become involved in corrupt prac-
tices—and will illustrate the argument with examples taken from developing
nations. The final section will advance some suggestions as to what can be done to
more fully institutionalize political parties.
Institutionalization of Political Organizations
The notion of institutionalization has been elaborated by Samuel Huntington (1968,
12), who defined institutionalization as 
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the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.
The level of institutionalization of a political system can be defined by the adapt-
ability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures.
So the level of institutionalization of any particular organization or procedure can
be measured by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence.
But what exactly is this “adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence”? 
Adaptability refers to an organization’s ability to adapt to changes in the environ-
ment in which the organization operates. This adaptability can be measured based on
three interrelated indicators. One is the organization’s age. In fact, old organizations
have had to learn how to adapt to environmental changes to survive, and they can use
this adaptive knowledge to cope with present and future changes. This is why older
organizations tend to be more adaptable. A second indicator of an organization’s
adaptability is what Huntington calls the “generational age.” This concept first refers
to the generation of leaders in power and second reflects an organization’s ability to
transfer power from one generation to the next. The more often power is peacefully
transferred from one generation to another, the more the organization is adaptable.
The third indicator gauges organizational adaptability. This term is used to indicate an
organization’s ability to find and perform new functions, once the objectives that the
organization was originally created to achieve have been achieved. In other words, the
organization either finds some (new) functions to perform or disappears. In this
respect, Huntington noted that “an organization that has adapted itself to changes in
the environment and has survived one or more changes in its principal functions is
more highly institutionalized than one that has not” (Huntington 1968, 15). To sum up,
the level of institutionalization of an organization increases with the organization’s
age, with generational changes in the organization’s leadership, and with the organi-
zation’s ability to always find new functions to perform.
Institutionalization also reflects an organization’s complexity. In Huntington’s words
(1968, 15), “the more complicated an organization is, the more highly institutionalized
it is.” Complexity refers to two distinct (sets of) characteristics (that is, the number of
organizational subunits and their differentiation). A greater number of subunits
enhances an organization’s ability to “secure and maintain the loyalties of its mem-
bers.” Moreover, differentiation is important because a diverse organization covers a
broad range of interests and products and makes it less vulnerable than organizations
“[that] produce(s) one product for one market” (Huntington 1968, 18). This means that
as the number and the differentiation of the organization’s subunits increase, the com-
plexity of the organization increases and so does its level of institutionalization.
The level of institutionalization of an organization does not simply depend on the
organization’s flexibility and complexity, but also on its autonomy. The autonomy of
political organizations “is measured by the extent to which they have their own inter-
ests and values distinguishable from those of other institutions and social forces.” This
last point is actually quite important. It means that the organization is institutionalized
if it has been able to develop interests, objectives, and procedures “that are not simply
expressions of the interests of particular social groups” (Huntington 1968, 20). 
Last (but not least), the degree of institutionalization of an organization depends
on its coherence and unity. In Huntington’s words, “an effective organization
requires, at a minimum, substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the
group and on the procedures for resolving disputes which come up within those
boundaries” (Huntington 1968, 22). 
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The Institutionalization of Political Parties
What Huntington said about the institutionalization of political organizations can
also be applied to the political party. Political parties, as organizations, are created
by certain individuals (or groups thereof) as means to achieve certain ends (Palom-
bara and Weiner 1966, 3–42). The institutionalization of political parties occurs
when parties develop the characteristics mentioned above: adaptability, complex-
ity, autonomy, and coherence. Yet what does this imply? 
As noted above, the adaptability of an organization reflects the organization’s age,
generational age, and flexibility to adapt to changes in the environment in which it
operates. The same logic applies to political parties. The level of institutionalization
of a political party reflects its age (how long the party has been in existence), its gen-
erational age (whether and how many times the party has been able to transfer
power from one generation to the next one), and whether it has been able to adapt to
environmental changes. 
The first two points are fairly clear, and the third can be illustrated by the fol-
lowing example. Imagine that a given party is created by a group of individuals
to achieve a certain objective (for example, to forbid the trade of the seeds of the
baobab trees and protect the survival of these majestic trees). The party is created,
it campaigns, it wins some electoral support, and it sends some representatives to
the national parliament, where these talented parliamentarians introduce a few
bills concerning the preservation of baobabs. Fellow parliamentarians understand
the importance of this issue and decide to pass the Protection of Baobabs’ Seeds
Act. At the end of this stylized process, this party has achieved the objective for
which it had been created, and it has no reason anymore to exist, unless, of
course, the party is able to identify new objectives to pursue and new functions to
perform.1 When a party finds new activities and functions to perform or when it
identifies new objectives to achieve, the party is said to have organizational
adaptability.
The complexity of political parties reflects the combination of two sets of charac-
teristics. The first set is represented by the number of organizational levels. It is, in
fact, believed that the complexity of a party organization increases as the number
of organizational levels increases. For example, a party characterized by four orga-
nizational levels (national, regional, provincial, local) is more complex than a party
characterized by only three levels (national, provincial, local). Complexity, how-
ever, reflects not only the number of organizational levels but also the number of
units at each level of organization. It is believed that the larger the number of units,
the bigger and more complex the party organization is. 
But what does it mean for a party to become autonomous from the environment
in which it operates? According to Panebianco, “There is autonomy when the
(party) organization develops its capacity to directly control the processes of
exchange with the environment.”2 Therefore, a party controls the processes of
exchange with the environment when
1 The most obvious case of a party being able to do so is when the survival of the party organ-
ization becomes a value in itself or rather an objective that a party may wish to achieve. On
this, see Panebianco (1982, chapter 4). The English translation is available as Political Parties:
Organization and Power, Cambridge University Press, 1988, chapter 4.
2 My translation of Panebianco’s Modelli di Partito (1982, 114).
(a) the party is able to finance most of its activities with the revenue generated
by the membership fees and dues—making it less dependent on the exter-
nal environment to finance itself, 
(b) the party has a fairly developed bureaucratic apparatus and selects its lead-
ers from within the party organization, and
(c) the party’s elected officials are controlled by (and therefore accountable to)
the party leadership and bureaucracy.
Finally, the level of institutionalization increases with the structural coherence of
the party organization. A political party’s structural coherence is low when a
party’s organizational subunits are quite independent from one another, as well as
from the party’s central organization. The structural coherence of a political party is
high when the party’s subunits are interdependent and their interdependence is
preserved by the fact that resources are managed and allocated among the various
subunits by the party central organization. 
Parties’ Weak Institutionalization and Potential for Corruption
In many developing nations with little (if any) experience of democratic gover-
nance, political parties have not been able to become fully institutionalized. This
section will try to illustrate why this may be the case and how parties’ weak institu-
tionalization relates to corruption.
As noted above, age is a crucial factor in determining the adaptability and level
of institutionalization of an organization. Also, the older one organization is, the
more it is institutionalized. The first and most obvious problem that parties in devel-
oping and democratizing countries have encountered in their path toward strong
institutionalization is that these countries have often had a relatively brief demo-
cratic experience. In countries, like Korea or Taiwan, for example, “political parties
also have not had the time to become well-defined.”3 As a result, political parties fre-
quently build their support around patron-client relationships, rather then through
well-developed issue-oriented platforms. In countries like Cambodia or Malaysia,
the presence of an authoritarian regime has certainly not allowed or favored the
institutionalization of political parties and of a competitive party system.4
There is a second problem. The fact that developing countries have had such a
brief democratic experience means that in most cases the parties that have emerged
in the course of the democratic transition are still led by the first generation of lead-
ers. This means that they have had little to no experience in transferring power
from one generation of party leaders to the next. This means that while the party is
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3 A more comprehensive discussion of South Korean parties can be found in Laura L. Thorn-
ton and David Kovick, “South Korea,” in Manikas and Thornton (2003, 263–316). For a dis-
cussion of Taiwanese parties, see David Kovick, “Taiwan,” in Manikas and Thornton (2003,
317–70).
4 See Laura L. Thornton, “Malaysia,” in Manikas and Thornton (2003, 139–82); and David
Kovick and Laura L. Thornton, “Cambodia,” in Manikas and Thornton (2003, 41–74). The
same point could actually be made about Nepal, where the multiparty democracy estab-
lished by the 1959 Constitution was suspended in 1962 when the government was dissolved
and parties were banned. See Mark Wallem and Ram Guragain, “Nepal,” in Manikas and
Thornton (2003, 184–85).
young, the generation of leaders is not, and this may spark some tensions within
the party itself. 
Also, political parties in many developing and democratizing nations have not
been able to develop complex and articulated party organizations. This means that
they have not been able to achieve what Panebianco calls “territorial diffusion”:
they have not been able to become rooted in the society that they are supposed to
represent. Without large numbers of basic units, parties are inherently unable to
become what they should be: that is, “a collection of communities, a union of small
groups dispersed throughout the country . . . linked by coordinating institutions”
(Duverger 1954, chapter 4). Running the danger of becoming “self-centered, inward
looking, and exclusive” (Melia 2005), unresponsive and unrepresentative of the
people whom they are supposed to speak for, political parties have trouble becom-
ing full-fledged legitimate institutions.
The final reason explaining the weak institutionalization of political parties in
some countries is that they have not been able to develop much autonomy (see box
11.1). This problem manifests itself in several ways. Compounding the lack of issue
orientation in party platforms mentioned above, in societies historically character-
ized by patron-client relationships (as for example in Asia and Africa), parties and
politicians are often expected to deliver some goods to their constituents. In some
cases, parties and politicians are “expected to pay for community and family
events, such as weddings and funerals” (Manikas and Thornton 2003, 10). In more
extreme cases, citizens expect “patronage and payments in exchange for political
support.”5 In such an environment, it is very hard for parties to insulate themselves
from the pressures and demands of their constituents. The more a party is insulated
from the pressures of the constituents, the more likely it is to resist the pressure to
get involved in illicit activities. 
The limited autonomy that parties enjoy in developing and democratizing coun-
tries is the result of an additional factor. Parties in these countries have encountered
major problems in structuring and institutionalizing their internal practices and pro-
cedures. In the experience of the Asian countries, for example, this problem emerges
because of the “unofficial and often familial, clan-like nature of many parties.”6 Par-
ties in these countries have not developed, established, and systematically applied
objective, merit-based mechanisms for selecting and promoting party bureaucrats,
cadres, and leaders. In the golden age of mass parties and mass party politics in
Western Europe, party leaders were often recruited from among the best party
cadres and leaders based on how loyal they had been to the party and how well they
had worked for it.7 This mechanism has demonstrated some shortcomings in con-
solidated democratic regimes. In fact, party leaders selected from among the party
cadres and bureaucrats based on their commitment to their party’s ideological
stance may sometimes lack the skills to understand, cope with, and possibly solve
the problems of contemporary complex democracies. Also, this is why scholars and
practitioners have extensively debated the crisis of highly ideological parties and
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5 This is, for example, the case in the Philippines. See Celito Arlengue and John Joseph S.
Coronel, “Philippines,” in Manikas and Thornton (2003, 217–62). The quote is taken from p.
217.
6 Laura L. Thornton, “Introduction,” in Manikas and Thornton (2003, 10).
7 See Panebianco (1982, 115). The classic studies on mass parties remain Duverger (1954) and
Neumann (1956, 395–421).
have suggested that parties should abandon their ideological baggage and become
sufficiently flexible to cope with a world that demands complex, nonideological
answers for complex problems.8 This said, one should keep in mind that selecting
party leaders on the basis of their loyalty to the party and to the party’s well-being
had also some obvious virtues in the mass parties’ golden age. The most important
virtue was that a party leader or cadre would not do (and would not allow any of
their subordinates to do) anything that could possibly harm the reputation of the
party. Imperfect as it could be, this system often prevented parties from (or mini-
mized the extent to which parties were) engaging in extensive illicit practices. 
Parties’ weak institutionalization (in terms of age, generational age, autonomy,
and so forth) is not the only cause of political corruption, but it is certainly one of
the causes of party corruption.9 The internal life of weakly institutionalized parties
is neither transparent nor accountable to voters and citizens. Yet parties must serve
as models and demonstrate the principles of governance. The behavior of parties
toward each other will reflect on the attitude that citizens have toward democracy.
Moreover, the internal organization (that is, if they are self-serving, divisive, and
intolerant, rather than inclusive, tolerant, transparent, and respectful of rules) will
serve as an indication of its behavior in government (Melia 2005). It will also
strongly influence the willingness of prospective members to join political parties.
Not surprisingly, weakly institutionalized parties tend to have a fairly small mem-
bership base. This means that they must find financial resources other than those
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Box 11.1 Examples of Interrelated Causes/Consequences of Weak Party 
Institutionalization
Youth of Democracy and Political Parties. Domination/abuse of power by one political
party; confusion of party and nation; marginalization of opposition parties; voter intim-
idation; little internal democracy; lack of membership, legitimacy, and ideology
Lack of Ideological, Issue-Oriented Platform. Donors and members expect financial ben-
efits and kickbacks from contributions to party; patronage networks develop; in many
countries, politicians and parties are expected to sponsor or pay for social services for
their constituents (schooling fees, roads, weddings, funerals . . . ); vote buying (cash or
gifts); party switching
Lack of Internal Procedures and Regulations. Little internal transparency-accountabil-
ity-democracy; mismanagement; hijacking of the party line by a few well-placed offi-
cials
Lack of Membership. Little financial contributions from party members leads to “cre-
ative fundraising; lack of legitimacy, representation, and responsiveness; reliance on
financial support by vested interests, squeezing out reformers; and misuse of state
resources.
Sources: Hodess 2001; Bryan and Baer 2005; and Manikas and Thornton 2003.
8 A review article on the party crisis debate can be found in Daalder (1992, 269–88). A more
recent assessment of the literature can be found in Pelizzo (2003).
9 One could very well argue that parties’ weak institutionalization is both a cause and a con-
sequence of corruption. The argument goes as follows: weakly institutionalized parties are
particularly prone to engage in corrupt practices, corruption undermines parties’ autonomy
from the environment in which they operate, and autonomy is a key component of institu-
tionalization. Therefore, if there is little to no autonomy, there is little to no institutionaliza-
tion. (I thank Marco Verweij for the useful remark.) 
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generated by membership fees, and when legally collected funds are insufficient to
cover the increasingly high costs of politics, parties may have to accept illicit contri-
butions, bribes, and kickbacks. The claim that “corruption is a symptom of deeper
institutional weakness” is quite accurate when applied to the corruption of political
parties. Parties’ corruption reflects the fact that they are weakly institutionalized.
Hence, to minimize and possibly eliminate corruption from party politics, it is nec-
essary to eliminate the conditions that make corruption possible (that is, parties’
weak institutionalization). But how can parties become properly institutionalized?
Conclusions and Suggestions
The previous section suggested that parties’ weak institutionalization in democra-
tizing countries or in newly established democracies is the result of a combination
of factors. One is that these countries have a fairly brief experience with democracy
and that party democracy and parties have literally not had the time to become
fully institutionalized. Yet, institutionalization is not just a matter of time. There are
some clear steps that parties should take (and that political reformers and civic
activists should advocate). If parties do not develop proper rules and procedures to
regulate their internal life, they will not attract party members. If they do not attract
members, they will not be able to finance themselves with membership fees. If they
cannot satisfy their financial needs legally, they will satisfy them illegally. Numer-
ous measures can be taken to strengthen the integrity and institutionalization of
political parties (see boxes 11.2 and 11.3); however, three overarching steps seem
particularly important: the regulation of the parties’ internal life, increased mem-
bership, and a stronger party bureaucracy.
Box 11.2 Nonexhaustive List of Measures for Greater Party Institutionalization
Political Parties
Codes of conduct and ethical standards for members and officials
• Inner-party democracy: Full membership involvement in election of party lead-
ers, officials, and candidates for public office
• Mandatory disclosure requirements on assets and interests
• Regular, independent, and publicly accessible financial audits 
• Independent monitoring, evaluation, and disciplinary committees and
processes
• Training and ethical education programs for leaders and party officials
• Term limits for party leaders
• Strengthen issue-driven platforms—develop party platform
• Greater interaction of political parties with civil society
• Educate voters on political parties and anti-corruption measures
Legislators
Effective legislation on, and enforcement of, laws regarding party registration and oper-
ation, political finance, electoral provisions, and declarations of assets and interests
• Consider the introduction of public subsidies and funding of political parties,
tied to party reforms
• Laws and regulations addressing the ability of public officials to direct govern-
ment business (that is, ensure competitive bidding practices).
Sources: Manikas and Thornton 2003; Bryan and Baer 2005.
Regulating Parties’ Internal Life. Parties must adopt formal rules to regulate the
selection of cadres, leaders, and candidates. These rules should be ratified in the
party’s formal documents and implemented. Violations of the internal rules should
be sanctioned by properly designed committees within the party itself. Parties
should also devise some mechanisms to regulate the decision-making process
within the party itself. When the decision-making process is transparent and party
members know how the party achieves a certain decision, they are quite likely to
support the party’s decision—even if it is one that they initially opposed—because
they see that decision as a legitimate one. 
The adoption and the implementation of these rules would address the fact that
parties are somewhat detached from society. According to an NDI study, “some
parties have alienated civic activists and leaders,” “the polarization between civil
society and parties is striking,” “activists eager to become involved in issue-based
political activity frequently turn to NGOs instead of joining political parties,” and
“civic groups are in practice effectively replacing parties by representing citizens on
issues of concern and presenting proposals to the government” (Manikas and
Thornton 2003, 11). Civic activists stay away from political parties not only because
parties are known to be corrupt but also because there seems to be no way in which
parties can be reformed and moralized. The fact that parties lack proper institu-
tional mechanisms for selecting cadres and leaders or for making decisions means
that if civic activists joined parties, they would have little to no power to reform the
parties themselves (Manikas and Thornton 2003, 10–11). Therefore, to attract desir-
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Box 11.3 Examples of Institutionalizing Political Parties and Curbing Corruption 
in Malaysia
• Background. Political parties are governed by the Malaysia Society Act (1966),
which requires them to register and submit financial accounts with the Ministry
of Home Affairs. These accounts are not disclosed to the public and do not
require parties to reveal their sources of funding. Neither does the law set limits
to contributions and spending nor bar the ownership of profitable enterprises
by parties, and it provides for little transparency in internal affairs. However,
civil-society groups and some political parties have advocated for change and
have been successful on some matters:
• Strengthening National Anti-Corruption Efforts. The Democratic Action Party
(DAP) has identified the curbing of corruption as one of its key objectives in its
platform, organized numerous workshops and debates on relevant legislation,
and provided extensive input on the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Bill of 1997.
• Selecting Leaders and Candidates. The Gerakan Party allows party offices to select
“election observers” for internal party elections.
• Fundraising. The United Malays National Organization (UNMO) prohibits
fundraising by local branches and divisions to avoid undue influence by donors
and misuse of funds by party members.
• Strengthening Ethical Standards and Discipline. The party Islam se Malaysia devel-
oped ethics standards requiring leaders to declare their assets and wealth and
appointed an ombudsman to monitor compliance. The UMNO established a
disciplinary committee to investigate and punish cases of corruption within the
party. The DAP requires candidates to resign from their seats should they vio-
late party principles and switch party.
Source: Manikas and Thornton 2003, 21–28.
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able members, it is very important for parties to develop and adopt some objective,
merit-based, and transparent rules and procedures to regulate their internal life.
Membership. This type of reform could have an additional benefit. By increasing
parties’ accountability to their members, it could give prospective members an
incentive to join parties and could expand parties’ membership base. This would
be quite an important result because even if parties charge minimal membership
fees, the expansion of parties’ membership base would also increase the party
income generated through membership fees and would reduce parties’ need to rely
on external sources of financial support—which is generally considered to be one
of the most important reasons why parties may accept illicit contributions and
become corrupt.10 In other words, by expanding their membership base, parties can
take one of the most important steps in the course of their institutionalization: they
can directly control how they are financed, or in Panebianco’s words, they “directly
control the processes of exchange with the environment.”11
There is an additional reason why the expansion of the membership base is
important for political parties: as the membership base expands to include addi-
tional social groups (religious, ethnic, socioeconomic, and so on), the party must
take into account the sometimes conflicting demands of these various social
groups. Its policy stances, decisions, and proposals are “likely to be the result of
competition among social forces. A political party, for instance, that expresses the
interests of only one social group—whether labor, business, or farmers—is less
autonomous than one that articulates and aggregates the interests of several social
groups. The latter type of party has a clearly defined existence apart from particu-
lar social forces” (Huntington 1968, 20). The fact that the party has an existence
independent of that of the social groups that the party represents means that the
party is autonomous from them, and as the party’s autonomy increases, so does its
institutionalization. 
Party Bureaucracy. As has been seen, the institutionalization of a political party is
strong when the party has high levels of autonomy and structural coherence. In the
previous paragraph, it was suggested how a party can be made more autonomous
from various social groups. But how is a party supposed to increase its structural
coherence? The structural coherence of a party increases as the party develops the
ability to control its subunits, keep them accountable, administer the allocation of
resources between the various subunits, decide the party line, and ensure that the
subunits adopt the centrally decided party line. A party’s ability to do all these things
depends, in its turn, on its ability to create a centralized party bureaucracy. It is the
party’s centralized bureaucracy that explains the party position to ordinary members,
tells elected officials how to conduct themselves, monitors the behavior of lower-level
officials and members, and sanctions what it considers improper conduct. 
Transparent internal rules and regulations, the expansion of membership, and
the development of a proper party bureaucracy are the conditions without which
parties cannot become strongly institutionalized—and without strong institutional-
ization, parties are particularly vulnerable to engaging in various forms of unethical
10 There is some consensus among scholars and practitioners alike that when legally col-
lected funds are insufficient to cover the increasingly high costs of politics, corruption does
not simply happen, it must happen. On this, see the “Report on Wilton Park Conference 748”
in 2004, which is included in this book in appendix 2.
11 My translation of Panebianco (1982, Modelli di Partito, 114).
behavior—including corruption. Indeed, as the former President of the Philippines,
Corazon Aquino (2003, 1–2), noted herself: “The search for a winning formula
against corruption . . . depends a lot on political parties, which are the training
grounds of political leaders. It is in the political party where the ideologies and val-
ues of young leaders are shaped. . . .”
Institutionalizing political parties, strengthening and reforming them from
within, goes hand in hand with the fight against corruption by other political insti-
tutions. Such reforms increase the legitimacy and representational value of parties,
build the popular trust toward democracy, and lend the national anti-corruption
efforts additional credibility.
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